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Abstract 
The combination of spending cuts, efforts to protect the poorest from some of their 
effects, and ‘localised’ decision-making are leading to an increase in the numbers of 
means tests designed by lower level institutions. This paper examines a case study of 
the effects of this, looking at the means-tested support which has been offered to 
English students applying to go to 52 universities from Autumn 2012, designed partly 
to offset the rise in general fees to or towards £9,000. 27 of these universities are 
offering significant levels of means-tested support through bursaries or fee reductions 
depending on parental income. Although using a common income definition, each 
university has designed its own system with widely varying criteria. Taken with the 
national maintenance grant system, these imply substantially different levels of 
support for students from lower and higher-income families. Nearly all of them 
involve significant downward steps or ‘cliff edges’ in support at particular income 
levels, often involving a drop of several thousand pounds. Just looking at student 
support by itself, this implies typical marginal withdrawal rates exceeding 40 per cent 
and even 100 per cent over particular income ranges. Taken together with the effects 
of other parts of the tax and benefit system that would have affected family income, 
the effect is marginal effective tax rates on family resources that exceed 50 per cent 
for the entire income range up to £43,000. They typically reach 180 per cent for 
£1,000 income variations around income of £25,000. For the most generous case, 
Oxford University, the £13,050 reduction in subsequent means-tested student support 
is equivalent to nearly the whole of the £13,250 net income difference between two-
child families that earned £17,000 and £44,000 in 2010-11. As well as introducing 
extra complexity and questions of equity in treatment within student finance, this kind 
of development runs counter to other parts of government policy, such as Universal 
Credit, intended to smooth out and simplify means-tests. As localisation is pushed 
further, and more agencies become responsible for designing their own mean tests, the 
lack of a system to take an overview of their overlapping effects, and to avoid 
undesirable design features will become an increasing problem across social policy, 
not just in this particular area. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1972, reforms to what were then rent rebates and allowances (now Housing 
Benefit) swept away structures with rules that varied between local authorities to 
establish uniform national rules for the ways in which benefits would relate to 
people’s incomes. The previous local variations and overlaps had been criticised as 
leading to deep but widely varying poverty traps – Mike Reddin (1968) had identified 
3,000 local authority-run means tests applying in the mid-1960s, of which some 1,500 
were unique in their rules. The overlaps between such schemes led Tony Lynes (1971) 
to point to the possibility of ‘paying surtax while living on the breadline’. In the forty 
years since then, systems for giving means-tested support, even if administered locally 
and relating to local charges such as rents, have generally had national rules. 
 
This is now set to change as three aspects of government policy collide: general cuts 
in public spending as the main route to rebalancing the public finances; attempts to 
protect some of those on low incomes from the effects of cuts; and a move towards 
‘localisation’, with more discretion for – and in some cases competition between – 
lower level parts of government or other institutions. 
 
One example of this is the reform currently being introduced for Council Tax Benefit, 
where the responsibility to achieve a 10 per cent cut in its costs has been passed down 
to local government (Communities and Local Government, 2011). The potential result 
is a wide variety of different rules between local authorities, including in the rates at 
which benefit is withdrawn as income rises (the ‘taper’ used in calculating benefit). 
What the end result of this will be on the ground, and its interaction with other major 
reforms is as yet unclear. However as Brewer, Browne and Jin have argued, “a 
Council Tax Benefit that operates separately from Universal Credit and has rules that 
vary across English local authorities has the potential to undermine many of the 
supposed advantages of Universal Credit” (2012, p.46). 
 
However, the results of the ‘localisation’ of another aspect of means-testing are now 
becoming clear, and may offer a case study of the potential results of other reforms 
that move in this direction. This is a so far little remarked-on aspect of the reforms to 
university and student finance that take effect for students entering higher education in 
Autumn 2012. Most of the discussion of these reforms has been around the effects of 
English university tuition fees that will rise – in most cases – to £9,000 per year, but 
paid through a levy of 9 per cent of each graduate’s later annual earnings to the extent 
that they exceed a threshold set initially at £21,000 (until the fees and other loans for 
living costs while a student are paid off). Proponents of this kind of ‘income 
contingent loan’ system argue that it is fair in that those who have benefited from 
higher education are the ones who pay for it, and is more progressive than alternatives 
(Glennerster, 2009; Browne, 2010; Barr, 2007, 2012). In theory a system of this kind 
should avoid the risk of an unpayable mortgage-type loan acting as a deterrent to 
going to university, as people only pay back as they are able to do so. Indeed, those 
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with low life-time earnings never repay the costs in full, as loan repayments come to 
an end after 30 years, regardless of whether anything is outstanding.  
 
As witnessed by widespread protests by current and potential future students and 
others since the reforms were proposed, many people remain unconvinced of these 
arguments, however. Concern has centred in particular on the way in which the 
prospect of up to £27,000 in ‘debt’ for fees – and more for living costs while a student 
– may deter students from low-income backgrounds in particular from going to 
university, reversing progress in slowly narrowing the wide social class gap in 
participation. In response the government and universities have boosted the systems of 
support based on current (or at least, recent) family income that supplement the 
relationship of the underlying repayment system to future lifetime graduate incomes: 
 First, the system of nationally means-tested maintenance grants to contribute to 
living costs while a student is being made somewhat more generous than for 
students facing lower fees who started up to 2011 (see Figure 1 below). 
 Second, central government will put resources into a ‘National Scholarship 
Programme’ (NSP) for universities to allocate to students from lower-income 
families. 
 Third, individual universities and other higher education institutions, if they charge 
fees above a floor level of £6,000 (which it appears they nearly all will, for at least 
some of their courses) will have to add their own resources to those available from 
the NSP, and take other measures to improve participation from students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds.
1
 These form a central part of the ‘access agreements’ 
which English universities have to make with the Office for Fair Access (OFFA) 
as a condition of charging higher fees to English undergraduates. 
 
It is the third of these – and the structures of the dramatically varying means tests 
based on parental income which have emerged as actual fee levels have been set at or 
near £9,000 per year – which is the main focus of this paper.2 The next section gives 
more of the background to the new system. Section 3 sets out the ways in which the 
rules can vary between universities, presenting the results of a survey of 52 
universities, accounting for 60 per cent of UK students, of the offers they were making 
to 2012 applicants in terms of means-tested bursaries and fee reductions. For 
(comparative) simplicity, the paper focuses on English full-time undergraduates. 
Section 4 discusses the overall picture this presents for different kinds of university, 
and Section 5 discusses the interaction of these means tests with the rest of the tax and 
benefit system. Section 6 concludes, drawing together some of the issues the emerging 
pattern raises, and its potential implications for further reforms of this kind. 
                                              
1
  See the last part of Section 3 for more discussion.  See Callender (2010) for discussion of 
what universities were already offering as bursaries and other support before the current 
reforms. 
2
  The focus is on the structures of the means tests involved, rather than on their potential effects 
on participation and student choice.  For the impacts of earlier – less extensive – systems of 
this kind, see Callender (2009, 2010), Pennell and West (2005), and West et al. (2009). 
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2. Background 
Higher education funding has long presented a policy conundrum as a result of 
competing aims and constraints: 
 Higher education generates a mixture of social and private returns, with OECD 
research suggesting that internationally the latter are greater than the former, with 
private returns accounting for more than 60 per cent of the benefits of higher 
education (Browne, 2010, p.21). 
 On a lifetime basis, subsidising the private returns of those who become graduates 
from general taxation is clearly regressive, as they go on – on average – to have 
higher earnings than others (Falkingham, Glennerster and Barr,1995). 
 However, there is a series of barriers to efficient outcomes if funding were simply 
left to individual students borrowing from the market, including credit market 
failures (borrowing may not be possible or may be high cost), levels of risk and 
uncertainty (the value of a degree will vary in unpredictable ways between 
students), and information problems (prospective students do not know how much 
they will earn in future or how it will be affected by having a degree) (Wyness, 
2010). 
 These barriers are likely to be greater for students from lower-income 
backgrounds, exacerbating equity problems and reducing social mobility still 
further.
3
  
 
Historically, higher education in the UK – for the relatively small group who entered 
it – was funded from general taxation, with no tuition fees, and with means-tested 
grants to cover at least part of living costs while a student (although these were 
gradually replaced by mortgage-type loans through the early 1990s). But following the 
Dearing Report of 1997, tuition fees have become increasingly important, particularly 
in England (on which this paper concentrates).  Initially these were set at £1,000 for 
each year of study (although only for students from higher-income families), paid up-
front, alongside loans for living costs that were repaid on an income contingent basis 
from future earnings. But after 2006, higher ‘top up’ fees were brought in, to be repaid 
– along with maintenance loans – through future earnings, with no up-front charges. 
The fees were initially capped at £3,000 per year. Students from lower-income 
families were entitled to a more generous mix of grants and loans for living costs, and 
a minimum bursary of £300 from the university (if charging fees towards the higher 
end).
4
 
 
                                              
3
  See, for instance, Naylor, Smith and McKnight (2002), for evidence of the greater riskiness of 
returns to a degree for students from lower social class backgrounds. 
4
  There was also a system of ‘opportunity bursaries’ worth a total of £2,000 over three years for 
students starting in 2001 and 2002.  See West, et al. (2009) for an analysis of their (positive) 
impacts on retention, debt levels, and financial worries. 
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By 2010-11 fees had reached £3,470 per year, with students receiving maintenance 
grants of £2,990 per year if parental income
5
 was less than a threshold of £25,000 per 
year, tapered off gradually to zero if income was over £50,000. For those receiving the 
full grant, universities also gave a bursary of at least £350. For those with parental 
income below the threshold, a maintenance loan of up to £3,590 was available, with 
the amount increasing to £5,060 as maintenance grants were withdrawn up to parental 
income of £50,000, but falling again to £3,750 for those with parental income over 
£60,000.
6
 Both fees and maintenance loans are repayable on the basis of 9 per cent of 
graduates’ incomes in excess of £15,000 per year for up to 25 years or until the loan 
(with a zero real interest rate) is paid off. 
 
On top of the £300 mandatory grant for low-income students, many universities 
developed their own discretionary bursary and other support systems, the fore-runners 
of those examined below. Callender reports from a survey of 117 higher education 
institutions in England that they offered 303 separate bursary and scholarship schemes 
in 2006-07, of which about 60 per cent were needs-based using some form of means-
testing. For lower-income students, receiving a full government grant, the average 
additional bursary was £1,051 per year. It averaged nearly £1,800 in ‘Russell Group’ 
universities (including £4,000 for first year students at Oxford), but was under £700 in 
less prestigious institutions (Callender, 2010, pp. 51-53). 
 
The Browne Report of October 2010 recommended radical developments to this 
system, moving towards a greater contribution from fees paid after graduation, 
allowing expansion of university places without further demands on public spending. 
It recommended that there should be a means-tested grant of £3,250 for students from 
lower-income families (but the mandatory award from universities, by then £350, be 
abolished), that available loans for living costs should be flat rate, rather than means-
tested, that the income threshold for loan repayment should be increased to £21,000 
(and its value linked to average earnings), but with the repayment period extended to 
30 years and with a real interest rate charged on outstanding loans. It envisaged 
universities charging fees of at least £6,000, with no cap, but with a progressively 
greater levy on universities charging fees above that level. The idea of this levy was to 
offset the long-run cost to government of having to meet loans that remained unpaid at 
the end of the 30 years. The report illustrated the long-run costs to graduates on the 
basis of average fees of £6,250, but examined aggregate financial flows using a range 
of average fees from £6,000 to £8,000 (Browne, 2010, pp.42-44). 
 
The report argued that its proposals, “put students at the heart of the system” and 
criticised the then current position as “...complex and confusing” with “means-testing 
perceived as burdensome ... there is a range of institutional bursaries that students 
often do not know about when making applications decisions” (p.36).  It appeared to 
                                              
5
  See below for the definition of ‘residual income’ used in this calculation. 
6
  The amount of loan available depends on whether the student is living away from home or 
not, and whether studying in London. 
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envisage a relatively modest role for university bursaries in the system, rising from a 
total value of £200 million to £300 million per year under its proposals (p.44). 
 
Publication of the Browne Report coincided with the 2010 Spending Review, in which 
the government announced that it would be dramatically cutting public spending on 
university tuition costs, withdrawing teaching grants altogether for humanities and 
social sciences, with universities expected to raise fees to between £6,000 and a cap of 
£9,000 (but without the levy on fees above £6,000 that Browne had envisaged). The 
June 2011 White Paper, Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, laid 
out that there would be a national maintenance grant system much as envisaged by 
Browne (but withdrawn by parental income of £42,600), but access to maintenance 
loans would remain means-tested. The threshold for repayment would rise to £21,000, 
earnings-linked, as proposed by Browne, and over 30 years, but with differential 
interest rates for those whose incomes were below and above the repayment threshold 
each year. 
 
Any university charging more than £6,000 would have to make an ‘access agreement’ 
with the Office for Fair Access (OFFA). This would include putting extra funding into 
bursaries, fee reductions or subsidised accommodation, for less well-off students 
(essentially those with parental income below £25,000) on top of government funding 
(building up to £150 million per year) of a National Scholarship Programme (NSP). 
The shape of this would be up to each university, subject to approval by OFFA. 
 
Table 1 summarises the resultant structure of student support of different kinds for 
English students entering universities in the Autumn of 2012. 
 
Table 1: Summary of student financial support from Autumn 2012 (English 
students) 
Main types of 
student financial 
support - 2012-13 
Yearly 
amount 
How is it paid? Pay 
back? 
Provided by 
Tuition fee loan Up to £9,000 To university Yes Government 
Maintenance loan Up to £7,675 Cash Yes Government 
National 
maintenance grant 
Up to £3,250 Cash No Government 
National Scholarship 
Programme 
At least 
£3,000 (1st 
year) 
Up to £1,000 cash, 
the rest fee waivers 
or discounts 
No Government and 
university 
University bursary Depends on 
university 
Cash / 
accommodation 
discount 
No University 
University tuition fee 
waiver 
Depends on 
university 
Tuition fee waiver No University 
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In setting up the new system, the Coalition government clearly expected that 
universities would charge a range of fees between £6,000 and £9,000, with students 
making their choice between institutions partly on the grounds of differential prices. 
In the event nearly all have gone for the top end of this range. Of the 52 institutions 
we examine below, for instance, the average fee set by the more research-intensive 
and prestigious ‘Russell Group’ universities is £8,860, and for the other large 
universities is around £8,500 (see Table 3).
7
 One consequence of this is that the 
Russell Group and a few other universities – doubtless mindful of the need for OFFA 
to approve their access agreements in the face of already low participation rates from 
students from lower-income backgrounds even before the fee increases, and guidance 
from OFFA on the amounts high-fee universities would be expected to spend on 
bursaries and outreach activities – have set up much more extensive means-tested 
bursary and fee reduction systems than apparently envisaged by the Browne Report. It 
is to these that we turn in the next section. 
 
3. Means-tested assistance offered by individual universities 
This section examines the means-tested bursaries and other assistance available to 
English undergraduate students commencing studies at UK universities in September 
2012. We focus on means-tested assistance, rather than purely merit- or academic 
achievement-based scholarships.
8 
For space reasons the analysis is restricted to full-
time students who have been resident in England because both the government and 
university funding rules are frequently different for students that have been resident in 
other parts of the UK or EU. 
 
Because of the complexities involved in comparing universities with what turn out to 
be elaborately different bursary systems, we also exclude several groups of students 
due to the presence of widely differing rules, and their smaller numbers, including 
mature students, those leaving public care, those with partners, and those not going to 
university for the first time. We focus on those living away from home, as although 
the rules are often the same for students living with their parents, they do occasionally 
vary. We also exclude foundation courses, foundation years, non-honours degrees, 
years abroad, and years in industry. 
 
We gathered information from the websites of universities as it was available in 
January 2012, the time when prospective students – intended to be ‘at the heart’ of the 
new system – would be finalising their application choices for the main UCAS 
deadline on 15 January.
9
 We looked at the 52 universities with the greatest number of 
                                              
7
  The precise figure would be affected by the balance between courses with different fees, 
which we have not allowed for. 
8
  These kinds of award may also be becoming more common, particularly as limits on 
recruiting students with the highest grades have been relaxed. 
9
  The deadline for applications to Oxford and Cambridge, and for medicine and dentistry 
courses, was 15 October 2011.  For some courses, such as art and design, there was a later 
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full-time undergraduates (based on Higher Education Statistics Agency data for the 
academic year 2009-10), and the two Russell-Group universities that do not fit into 
this category: Imperial College London and the London School of Economics.
10
 Two 
of the 54 (Central Lancashire and Huddersfield), however, have not yet announced 
their system of bursaries (although they say that there will be bursaries of some kind). 
We therefore analyse 52 institutions (out of the UK total of 165), representing 782,000 
students, or 59 per cent of the total number of full-time undergraduates studying at 
UK universities.  
 
The universities can be split into two main groups: those focusing their means-tested 
support mainly or exclusively based on the conditions of the government-required 
National Scholarship Programme (NSP); and those with more generous or extensive 
systems. Table 2 shows that all twenty Russell Group universities have more generous 
bursaries, apart from Queen’s University Belfast, which has no means-tested support 
for English students.
11
  There are also eight non-Russell Group universities with more 
generous or extensive means-tested bursaries or fee reductions that are offered to 
those with parental income of over £25,000, giving a total of 27 institutions in the 
more generous group.  There are 22 non-Russell Group universities focusing their 
bursaries mainly based on the conditions of the NSP, which means that no student 
from a family with a residual income of over £25,000 will be entitled to means-tested 
support.
12
 As well as Queen’s University Belfast, two of the universities we examined, 
Glamorgan and Ulster, did not advertise any means-tested bursaries for English 
students. 
 
One element of uniformity is that the incomes used for the means-tests are all based 
on Student Finance England’s measure of ‘residual household income’ which, for 
undergraduates starting in September 2012, will mainly consist of their parents’ 
earnings in the financial year 2010-11, in addition to the student’s projected unearned 
income for the 2012-13 academic year.
13
 Student Finance England will assess incomes 
                                                                                                                                            
deadline of 24 March.  The information for the universities we examine below had not 
changed when checked again in April 2012. 
10
  We take the Russell Group as it was in January 2012.  Four more universities will join the 
Group in future: Exeter (one of the other larger universities we examine), as well as the three 
smaller universities not covered in our survey (Queen Mary University of London, York and 
Durham). 
11
  Queen’s University Belfast does offer merit-based bursaries for English students, with up to 
£2,500 available depending on the student’s A level results.  
12
  Apart from more limited contributions to specific costs: for instance, Coventry University 
offers assistance with items such as field trips for those with national maintenance awards, 
and so residual incomes up to £42,600. 
13
  One curiosity of the system as it is laid out is that the definition of a student’s current 
unearned income does not only include items such as bank interest, but also includes, “all 
income from scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, awards, grants, allowances; and all other 
payments for attending your course during the academic year”.  On the face of it, this opens 
up a bizarre circularity.  Without a bursary the residual income could put a student below one 
of the thresholds that many universities use as a criterion of eligibility for a significant award, 
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based on the information provided in the student’s application, and then provide the 
relevant universities with the information so they can use it for their own means-tests. 
For later years, parental income for subsequent years is used.  
 
Table 2: Universities surveyed 
 
Russell group universities (20) Primarily using only National Scholarship 
Programme (22) 
Birmingham Birmingham City 
Bristol Bournemouth 
Cambridge Coventry 
Cardiff De Montfort 
Edinburgh Kingston 
Glasgow Leeds Metropolitan 
Imperial College London Liverpool John Moores 
King’s College London London Metropolitan 
Leeds Manchester Metropolitan 
Liverpool Middlesex 
London School of Economics Plymouth 
Manchester Salford 
Newcastle Sheffield Hallam 
Nottingham Brighton 
Oxford East London 
Queen’s University Belfast(*) Greenwich 
Sheffield Hertfordshire 
Southampton Hull 
University College London University of the Arts, London 
Warwick West of England 
 Westminster 
Non-Russell group but with more 
generous bursaries (8) 
Wolverhampton 
Anglia Ruskin  
Exeter No means-tested bursaries (2) 
Kent Glamorgan 
Northumbria Ulster 
Nottingham Trent  
Oxford Brookes No information yet (2) 
Portsmouth Central Lancashire 
Strathclyde Huddersfield 
(*) No means-tested support for English students. 
                                                                                                                                            
such as £25,000.  The student would therefore be entitled to a bursary, but including the 
bursary could put her above the threshold, and so no longer entitled to it, putting her back 
below the threshold, and so on.  We discussed this with Student Finance England who said 
that this was not the intention, but who could only refer to the rules shown on its website 
quoted above as guidance 
(http://www.studentfinance.direct.gov.uk/portal/page?_pageid=153,4680136&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL). Doubtless the guidance will be clarified before this situation arises in 
practice in the Autumn. 
9 
 
The parental income used is before deduction of tax or national insurance, but does 
not include items such as tax credits or other benefits. It excludes pension 
contributions eligible for tax relief and an allowance for each other financially 
dependent child apart from the student (which was £1,130 in 2010-11). There is no 
other adjustment for family size. There is a similar allowance if either parent is a 
student as well. In thinking about the interaction between this system and other parts 
of the tax and benefit system, as we do in Section 5 below, in terms of a family 
means-test, this means that the effective marginal tax rates implicit in the systems 
apply to gross parental earnings in the period two years earlier.  
 
The national maintenance grant 
Underlying the individual university bursaries and fee reductions is the national 
system of means-tested maintenance grants. The rules of this are relatively 
straightforward and the same for every English student whether or not they live at 
home or away, or study inside or outside London. For 2012-13 it will be £3,250 per 
year for those with a residual income of £25,000 or less. For those with higher 
incomes the amount is reduced smoothly at marginal rate of around 18.2 per cent until 
£42,600, at which point the grant is £50. For those with higher residual incomes, there 
is no government grant. As can be seen in Figure 1 below, apart from the small dip at 
£42,600, the system avoids undesirable sharp ‘cliff edges’ for entitlement of the kind 
that were highlighted by criticism of the Coalition government’s original proposals in 
2011 for withdrawing Child Benefit from higher rate taxpayers. Around 40 per cent of 
students receive full grants, 20 per cent partial grants and 40 per cent none (SLC, 
2011, table 3A). 
 
Figure 1: Means-tested national maintenance grant (£/year) 
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Individual university systems 
As an introduction to the range of systems on offer, Figure 2 illustrates the total values 
of means-tested support from government and university for first-year students 
advertised by four universities: 
 Southampton University, whose rules mimic the smooth pattern of the national 
system. 
 University College London, with a sharp cliff-edge in entitlement at residual 
income of £25,000. 
 The London School of Economics, whose stepped system is fairly typical of the 
more generous systems. 
 Oxford University, whose system is generally the most generous on offer to 
students from lower-income families. 
 
Figure 2: First year means-tested support from government and four selected 
universities (£/year) 
 
 
Source: Individual university websites, January 2012. 
 
Note that for comparative purposes and simplicity we show here as ‘means-tested 
support’ the total value of bursaries and of fee reductions, although the mix of these 
varies between universities. It should also be noted that in the long run, fee reductions 
may not have the full value to the student shown here. This is because a substantial 
proportion of students may not pay off the full amount of the fees and maintenance 
loans by the end of the 30 year period. In fact, Chowdry, Dearden and Wyness (2010, 
table 4) suggest that at fee levels of £9,000 more than half of all graduates will have 
some debt written off. For someone who believed they would be in that position, at 
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of debt that would eventually be written off and covered by government. The analysis 
does not take account of the value of maintenance loans, although for some with low 
life-time earnings the low interest rates applied mean that they would have a positive 
value to the recipients. 
 
The Southampton system – uniquely – basically follows the logic of the national 
maintenance grant. Students with residual income of £25,000 or less are entitled to 
support (a fee reduction) of £3,000 on top of the national grant of £3,250. This steps 
down by £200 if income is £25,001 and by a further £200 for each £1,000 of income, 
until it reaches £200 for residual incomes from £38,001 to £42,600, above which it is 
withdrawn altogether. In total, then, a student with residual income of £25,000 would 
receive support of £6,250, reducing gradually to about £1,080 at a residual income of 
£38,001, giving a combined effective marginal withdrawal rate of just under 40 per 
cent. 
 
By contrast, University College London offers a much simpler ‘slab’ system. Students 
with residual income of up to £25,000 receive support (a cash bursary)
14 
of £3,500 on 
top of the national system. Between £25,001 and £42,600 support is £1,000, above 
which it is withdrawn. Looking over the whole range from £25,000 to £42,600 the 
withdrawal rate is much the same as for a student going to Southampton – a difference 
in total support of £6,750 over the range, or a combined withdrawal rate of 38 per 
cent. But most of the withdrawal of the UCL support is concentrated in a single cliff 
edge at £25,000. At the limit, a difference of just £1 in reported income between 
£25,000 and £25,001 leads to a reduction in support of £2,500. The advantage of 
simplicity comes at a cost in terms of potential perverse behavioural incentives, or at 
least in inequity of treatment between those just below and just above the cliff. 
 
UCL’s neighbour, the London School of Economics, has set fees at £8,500 (rather 
than the £9,000 set by the others) and also offers £3,500 in additional support (mainly 
a cash bursary) for those with incomes up to £18,000, but then withdraws it in a more 
gradual series of steps by £42,600. This means it is more generous than UCL to most 
of those with residual incomes between £25,000 and £35,000. It also offers a further 
£3,000 to first year students in the relatively unusual position for younger students of 
having an income of £3,000 or less.
15
 Apart from the sharp cliff edge at £3,000, the 
steps down are less dramatic than those for UCL students, but with the same overall 
difference in treatment over the range from £18,000 to £42,600.  
 
                                              
14
  For first year students in UCL halls of residence this is split between a £2,000 
accommodation bursary and a £1,500 cash bursary. 
15
  This could include students who are estranged from their parents or have been in care.  The 
additional ‘LSE NSP award’ of £3,000 for students with very low incomes in their first year 
follows the standard rules of the National Scholarship Programme, in that £2,000 of it is a fee 
reduction or accommodation discount and only £1,000 is a cash bursary.  For these students in 
their second and third years, the addition is a £1,500 fee reduction.  The LSE’s website warns 
that NSP allocations will change in later years, so the rules may change for later entrants. 
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Oxford University is more generous than any of these, particularly for first year 
students, offering both fee reductions and bursaries for those with lower incomes. 
Those with residual income of up to £16,000 would pay first year fees of only £3,500, 
a reduction of £5,500 from its standard fee, and would receive a £4,300 bursary on top 
of the government grant. The fee reduction steps down for incomes above £16,000 
and again at £20,000, and those with incomes above £25,000 pay the full fee. The 
bursary is reduced in a series of (mainly £500) steps to £1,000 between £40,001 and 
£42,600, above which it is withdrawn. This means that first year students with family 
income up to £16,000 are offered total support of £13,050; those with incomes of 
£25,001 support of £5,750, reducing to zero at incomes of £42,601 or above. This is 
clearly very generous to low-income students, but implies some very high effective 
marginal tax rates. Someone with income of £9,001 more than the first threshold of 
£16,000 would receive £7,300 less support in total – an effective withdrawal rate of 81 
per cent. Looking over the whole range from £16,000 to £42,601, the difference in 
total support is just over 50 per cent of the income difference. As we explore in 
Section 5, this has some startling consequences when considered alongside the rest of 
the tax and benefit system. 
 
The more general pattern: More generous systems for first year students 
Twenty-seven of the 52 universities we surveyed have means-tested support systems 
of this kind. In comparing them, several differentiating factors are highlighted in 
Table 3: 
 Several have higher levels of support for students in their first year as compared to 
later years of their course,
16
 while others keep the level of funding the same. 
 Second, several have significant amounts of funding available, particularly for the 
poorest students, subject to a further assessment of financial need (with the 
university using its own discretion or criteria, such as living in a deprived 
neighbourhood) or with a defined number of additional bursaries and fee 
reductions, given out based on a competitive application process.
17
 This means one 
cannot determine from the published means-test alone which students will be 
given this support, although frequently it is a condition for such bursaries that the 
student has a residual income of, for instance, below £25,000. In the comparisons 
below we show the effects of assuming whether or not students get this extra 
funding. 
 Thirdly, some universities use other criteria to decide upon the students to whom 
they will allocate support. For instance, Warwick University allocates all of its 
means-tested support to students from state schools, with no means-tested funding 
available for those that attended private schools (unless on a scholarship because 
of low income). 
                                              
16
  Presumably on the argument that after the first year, some students will be more aware of the 
benefits of a degree, and have a better understanding of the income-contingent nature of the 
loan repayments, rather than just as a recruitment hook. 
17
  This generally refers to funding from the National Scholarship Programme, which is available 
for some students with incomes of £25,000 or less. 
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In addition, some universities only offer awards to those who put them as their first 
UCAS choice, such as Anglia Ruskin. 
 
Table 3: 27 universities with more generous means-tested support 
University Fee 
Russell 
Group? 
1st year 
bursary 
different? 
Extra funding  
with conditions 
of financial need 
(apart from low 
income) 
Overall criteria? 
Birmingham £9,000 Yes No Yes No 
Bristol £9,000 Yes No Yes No 
Cambridge £9,000 Yes Yes Yes No 
Cardiff £9,000 Yes Not specified No 
Only to students living away from 
home 
Edinburgh £9,000 Yes No Yes No 
Glasgow £6,750 Yes Yes No No 
Imperial £9,000 Yes No No No 
King’s £9,000 Yes Yes Yes No 
Leeds £9,000 Yes Yes Yes No 
Liverpool £9,000 Yes Yes No No 
LSE £8,500 Yes Yes (*) No No 
Manchester £9,000 Yes Yes Yes No 
Newcastle £9,000 Yes Yes Yes 
Only for those from low 
participation area, or participating 
in one of the access schemes 
Nottingham £9,000 Yes Yes Yes No 
Oxford £9,000 Yes Yes No No 
Sheffield £9,000 Yes Yes Yes No 
Southampton £9,000 Yes No No No 
UCL £9,000 Yes No No No 
Warwick £9,000 Yes No No  State school only 
Anglia Ruskin £8,300 No Yes Yes No 
Exeter £9,000 No No No No 
Kent £9,000 No Yes Yes From low participation area 
Northumbria £8,500 No No No No 
Nottingham 
Trent 
£8,500 No No Yes No 
Oxford Brookes £9,000 No No No No 
Portsmouth £8,500 No Yes No No 
Strathclyde £9,000 No No No No 
Source: Individual university websites, January 2012, as applying to English students (rules for Welsh 
and Scottish students will differ).  
(*) LSE’s potential additional award for those with incomes below £3,000 is halved in the second and 
third years; other awards the same in all three years.  
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Figure 3 shows the total means-tested support for each of the 27 universities that 
would be automatically given to every first year student with a given income. It 
generally excludes bursaries given on the basis of additional criteria (such as 
successfully applying for the additional bursaries given as part of the National 
Scholarship Programme).
18
  The intention of the figure is to show the general range, 
rather than the detail for each university, so most of the individual schemes are 
unlabelled. Several features are apparent: 
 There is a considerable range in generosity for the lowest-income students, from 
less than £4,000 (Cardiff)
19 
to more than £13,000 (Oxford). Edinburgh also offers 
the lowest-income English students support of more than £10,000. The range is 
somewhat narrower for those with incomes between £25,001 and £42,600, apart 
from Imperial College London and Kent (assuming its additional criteria are met). 
 Only Imperial College and Glasgow offer support for those above the 
government’s £42,600 threshold.20 
 Nearly all of the systems involve ‘cliff edges’, with sharp drops in entitlement at 
particular income thresholds, particularly but not only at £25,000. 
 A typical system would offer total support of around £6,000 (including the 
government maintenance grant) for students with incomes below £25,000, falling 
to around £4,500 just above it and then tapering off to be withdrawn by £42,600. 
                                              
18
  However, it does show the position for three universities on the assumption that a further 
criterion is met: that the student went to a state school or to a private school on a means-tested 
scholarship (Warwick); that the student lives in a ‘low participation neighbourhood’ or meets 
other criteria to be specified later (Kent); or lives in a low participation neighbourhood or 
enters through a special entry programme (Newcastle).  If these conditions are not met, there 
would be no award beyond the national maintenance grant. 
19
  Cardiff’s system has the unusual feature that over some income ranges the amount of grant 
offered can rise as income rises, as it is based on topping up the total of government grants 
and loans to a certain figure. 
20
  Glasgow offers a £1,000 first year only fee waiver for English students, which could 
equivalently be thought of as a fee reduction for all English students in that year. 
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Figure 3: First year means-tested support automatically offered by government 
and university, 27 universities (£/year) 
 
 
 
Source: Individual university websites, January 2012. For Kent, Newcastle and Warwick assumes that 
other conditions are met.  
 
Allowing for further support from the National Scholarship Programme (NSP) 
As noted above, some universities reserve significant portions of funding for specific 
bursaries targeted at low-income students (generally in line with the proposed criteria 
for the NSP), but only to certain students, not all within a particular income band. 
Nine universities within the group of 27 do this, with criteria including: 
 Applicants who were entitled to free school meals (Birmingham) 
 Those from particular areas (Anglia Ruskin, Sheffield, Nottingham) 
 Those with low incomes and high A level grades (Newcastle) 
 Having ‘no income’ (Leeds) 
 Meeting more than one criterion for disadvantage (Cambridge) 
 For certain low-income students (King’s College London, Nottingham Trent)  
Figure 4 shows the difference that meeting these criteria could make. Sheffield 
becomes potentially the most generous for the lowest-income students, and 
Cambridge is almost as generous as Oxford for the lowest-income students (and more 
generous for those with incomes between £16,000 and £25,000). 
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Figure 4: First year means-tested support from government and university, 
assuming low-income students meet additional conditions, 27 universities (£/year) 
 
 
 
Source: Individual university websites, January 2012.  
 
Second and third year support 
For many of the universities, the bursaries given in the second year onwards are 
different, and generally less than in the first year. Figure 5 shows the position for later 
years on the same basis as Figure 3. The range for the lowest income students is 
narrower than for first year students – from less than £4,000 (Cardiff)21 up to just over 
£10,000 for English students at Edinburgh, and only Imperial College London offers 
total support of more than £6,000 for students with incomes above £25,000. 
                                              
21
  Cardiff has not yet confirmed their bursaries for the second year onwards – in Figure 4 it is 
assumed their bursaries will be the same as in the first year.  Similarly, King’s College 
London has not confirmed whether the ‘King’s Living Bursary’ will be the same after 2012-
13, but we assume here that it will be. 
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Figure 5: Second and third year means-tested support automatically offered 
from government and university, 27 universities (£/year) 
 
Source: Individual university websites, January 2012. Assumptions as in Figure 3.  
 
Universities using only the National Scholarship Programme 
The other 22 universities for which we obtained information (listed in Table 2) base 
what they are offering around the government’s National Scholarship Programme.22 In 
summary they have the following characteristics: 
 Most offer a fixed number of scholarships, so students applying are not guaranteed 
that they would receive them, even if meeting the main criteria. For instance, 
Sheffield Hallam has 560 awards available, and the University of Westminster 222 
means-tested awards. 
 All involve some income limit, most commonly £25,000, but a few use a lower 
threshold of £16,190 (based on eligibility for Free School Meals). De Montfort 
University implies that it will allocate 480 £3,000 awards to those with the lowest 
incomes first. 
 Many involve additional criteria, such as A level scores (UCAS points), coming 
from an area of low participation, coming from particular ‘partnership’ schools, or 
having non-graduate parents. Some will use points systems weighting different 
characteristics, including low income. 
 Most offer awards of £3,000 for the first year with either no awards in later years 
(or give no information on them) or lower awards in second and third years. 
                                              
22
  This sets out general requirements, including that income is not more than £25,000, and that 
awards total £3,000, with a maximum of £1,000 paid in cash. The number of awards available 
depends on the number of students at the institution, not on the composition of the student 
body. 
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Coventry University offers its 196 ‘Phoenix’ awards for all three years, as does 
Hull University for those with A levels at AAB or above. 
 Several have additional lower value awards for those who do not receive the 
£3,000 level. For instance, Middlesex University has 420 first year awards at 
£3,000 and 675 at £1,000. 
 Awards are typically for fee reduction or a contribution towards specific costs, 
with a maximum of £1,000 paid in actual cash. 
 
In terms of the relationship between family income and level of award this generally 
creates a situation where students either receive only the national maintenance grant 
(as illustrated in Figure 1) or may receive an additional amount – £3,000 under 
standard NSP conditions – provided that income is below a threshold, often £25,000. 
This creates the situation illustrated in Figure 6, where there is a potential cliff edge in 
entitlement at the income threshold – although a student applying will not know 
whether they will be one of the successful ones who will succeed in the competition 
for awards. 
 
Figure 6: Means-tested support from government and university, where standard 
£3,000 support under National Scholarship Programme may be available but no 
other programme (£/year) 
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4. Implications of the means-tests 
As implied in the previous section, all of these systems imply quite significant rates of 
withdrawal as family income rises, often with very high rates of withdrawal – cliff 
edges – at particular income levels. Very high marginal withdrawal rates – or effective 
marginal tax rates – are usually seen as undesirable for three reasons: 
 They can act as a disincentive to additional earnings 
 They can give an incentive to behaviour that reduces reported income (including 
mis-reporting of circumstances to slip below particular thresholds, or a strategic 
choice, such as which of two separated parents’ income to report) 
 They can lead to feelings of injustice, if those just below a threshold are treated 
much more favourably than those who are only slightly better off.
23
 
They can also add to uncertainty within a system, as people may not know in advance 
which side of a threshold they will fall once all the calculations are done, and this will 
make a major difference to their treatment. In this case that could add to barriers to 
access. 
 
The major plank of Coalition social security policy has been the introduction of 
Universal Credit, designed both to amalgamate several means-tested benefits and tax 
credits and to smooth out their combined means-tests precisely to avoid problems of 
this kind (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010; Brewer, Browne and Jin, 2012). 
 
In this case, the immediate implications for work incentives may be limited. The main 
component of income used is gross parental earnings two years before a student enters 
university (and students’ vacation earnings are excluded). It is possible but generally 
unlikely that parents might realise the impact of their earnings in one year on the 
potential position two years later of their children starting sixth form if they then go 
on to university – perhaps only the most assiduous readers of the financial 
supplements of weekend newspapers would be likely even to think about this, and 
then only when word gets around about the new system. 
 
But the second and third problems are more likely to apply, and particularly where 
there are sharp cliff edges involved – as witnessed by the strong reactions to the 2011 
proposal to withdraw Child Benefit if a parent tripped over the higher rate income tax 
threshold. That involved a potential sudden drop in annual income of £1,058 for a one 
child family or £2,415 for a three child family (at 2012-13 Child Benefit rates). Many 
of the systems we have examined involve a series of steps in entitlement for students 
that are as large as these – sometimes much larger. 
 
Of course, some parents may not be particularly interested in the long-term liabilities 
of their children to repay fees and loans, and students themselves may see the precise 
                                              
23
  There may also be feelings of injustice where the number of awards is limited, and two 
students with otherwise identical circumstances find themselves differently treated. 
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working out of the system as a random windfall process.
24 
But clearly many 
universities regard the attraction of their means-tested support as being important in 
terms of recruitment, and so have taken the judgement that applicants and those 
advising them do value this kind of support. For many therefore, the way the system 
works will be important. 
 
Equally, when applying to university, applicants – apart from the most confident – 
will not know whether they will succeed, and if so, which of their choices they will go 
to. But some may well have a good idea that they have a good chance of going to, say, 
one of the 27 universities with more generous systems listed in Table 1. Figure 7 
therefore shows the (unweighted) average effective marginal withdrawal rates for 
those 27 universities implied by the first year support regimes shown in Figure 3.
25 
In 
such calculations, the marginal rate calculated will depend on the variation in income 
used. In this case we illustrate the position for £1,000 differences in residual income 
(eg. comparing someone with income of £25,001 with their treatment if income was 
£24,001), avoiding showing the more extreme marginal rates that would apply to very 
small variations around particular threshold. 
 
Looking at this makes several things clear. First, over the whole range from £25,000 
to £43,000, the lowest average withdrawal rate is around 20 per cent of a £1,000 
income variation – effectively incomes where the main change is in the national 
maintenance grant. But superimposed on this are a series of spikes – the castellations 
in the diagram – where rates are much higher. These average more than 40 per cent 
around £30,000 and £35,000, more than 70 per cent at £43,000 and more than 100 per 
cent at £25,000. In other words, a typical student at one of these universities would 
receive more than £1,000 less if their family income had been £25,001 rather than 
£24,001. There are also spikes in marginal rates at around £16,000 and £20,000. 
 
Other ranges of income variation may be relevant for some people, and the wider the 
range, the lower the importance of particular spikes. But over the main range – from 
£25,000 to £42,600 – the average reduction in support for these universities would be 
about £6,000, corresponding to a 34 per cent marginal withdrawal rate over this range. 
 
 
                                              
24
  Looking at the predecessor discretionary bursary system, Callender (2009, p.15) found that 28 
per cent of students thought that bursaries were important in deciding where to go to 
university, but 58 per cent of parents did so. 
25
  Remembering that the net benefit of support – and so the effective rate of withdrawal –  may 
ultimately be lower where part of the loan would eventually have been written off  in any 
case. 
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Figure 7: Mean marginal support withdrawal rate (%) on residual income per 
£1,000, 27 universities  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on assumptions used in Figure 3. 
 
5. Interaction with other parts of the tax and benefit system 
This part of means-testing does not exist in isolation, however. Variations in gross 
incomes, usually earnings, will also have affected families’ tax and national insurance 
liabilities, and their entitlements to tax credits and other benefits. For instance, a 
family in the withdrawal range for tax credits in 2010-11 (the relevant year for 
parental incomes affecting residual income for students entering in Autumn 2012) 
would already have been affected by a 70 per cent effective marginal tax rate from 
income tax, National Insurance Contributions, and tax credit reduction. Those with 
lower incomes would have faced higher marginal rates as a result of Council Tax 
Benefit reductions (and for tenants from Housing Benefit withdrawal). The dotted 
lower line in Figure 8 shows the effective marginal tax rates in 2010-11 from these 
other parts of the tax and benefit system, drawn from the Department for Work and 
Pensions’ tax-benefit tables for a two child single-earner family paying a typical 
Council Tax but no rent.
26
 For much of the range up to just above median earnings the 
rates that year were 70 per cent or higher, dropping to 31 per cent where only basic 
rate income tax and NICs were involved, and eventually settling down at 41 per cent 
                                              
26
  http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=tbmt.  Note that the DWP results have been 
rescaled in terms of the ‘residual income’ that would be generated by income from earnings 
alone if one of the children remained at home and one went to university, that is, deducting an 
allowance for one other child still at home in calculating residual income. 
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for those with the highest incomes, affected only by higher rate income tax and 1 per 
cent NICs.  
 
Figure 8: Total effective marginal tax and withdrawal rates (%) on £1,000 
differences in parental income, single-earner families with one child going to 
university (first year) and one child still at home: Average for 27 universities 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Figure 7 and DWP tax-benefit tables for 2010-11.  
 
The solid line in the figure then combines the underlying marginal tax rates that had 
affected a family of this kind in 2010-11, with the effects of the student support 
system for first year students entering in Autumn 2012 from Figure 7. This is, of 
course, a retrospective calculation: back in 2010-11 parents would not have been able 
to foresee that their income variations would have this effect. It is also a family-based 
calculation, effectively adding together the impacts of gross income variations in 
2010-11 on taxes and benefits for the parents at the time and on the support for the 
student in 2012 (the main effect of which will be on their outstanding student debt 
when they – hopefully – graduate in 2015). Some might argue that a family-based 
calculation is inappropriate, and children and parents should be treated as separate 
units. But parents will still be closely involved with their children’s welfare when they 
are students – and, appropriately or not, the whole logic of the ‘residual income’ 
means test is that parents and students should be considered together. 
 
Even allowing for these provisos, the results are striking. For the entire income range 
up to £43,000 the effective marginal tax and withdrawal rate exceeds 50 per cent (the 
level of top rate income tax which was abolished by the 2012 Budget). At £30,000 and 
£35,000 a £1,000 rise in income only leaves the family £200 better off in the long run. 
At £16,000, £20,000 and £43,000 the combined marginal rate is 100 per cent or more 
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– a family could ruefully reflect that what they had thought of as the product of some 
overtime left them no better off in the long run. And at the key £25,000 threshold, a 
rise in income of £1,000 would on average leave them £800 worse off in the long run, 
as the rate spikes at 180 per cent.
27
 
 
For particular families the results could be even more extreme. Figure 9 shows the 
most dramatic case, if the same family’s child succeeded in getting a place at Oxford 
this Autumn. Doubtless the joy in this success and pleasure in the generosity of the 
Oxford bursary and fee reduction system would offset any feeling of chagrin as to the 
effects of means-testing. But a net eventual loss of £4,000 resulting from a £1,000 rise 
in income (the 500 per cent marginal tax rate shown) around the £16,000 threshold 
might give pause for thought if any parents – or their children – realised it had 
affected them. There are similar spikes of total marginal rates well above 100 per cent 
at £20,000, £25,000 and £43,000. 
 
Even looking over the whole income range, rather than at the extreme rates around 
particular thresholds, a two child family whose earnings were £44,000 in 2010-11 
would have had a net income £13,250 higher than one with earnings of £17,000 (using 
the calculations underlying Figure 8). But the result of this, as we have seen, would 
then be a reduction in means-tested support for the child going on to Oxford of 
£13,050 in her first year. Taking the system as a whole, a family whose earnings were 
two and a half times the national median rather than 70 per cent of it would be only 
£200 better off as a result in the long run. This 99 per cent tax rate is impressively 
egalitarian, but does conflict with what are often seen as constraints in other aspects of 
public policy. 
                                              
27
  For many of the universities with less generous systems, with a fixed number of £3,000 
awards available for some those with incomes up to £25,000, but then a complete cliff edge, 
the combined marginal tax rate over a £1,000 income change crossing this threshold, the 
combined marginal rate would be even higher, around 370 per cent. 
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Figure 9: Effective marginal tax rates (%) on £1,000 differences in parental 
income, families with one child going to Oxford University (first year) and one 
child still at home  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Figure 2 and DWP tax-benefit tables for 2010-11.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In a national review of means-testing, the National Audit Office (2011, figure 1) 
identified five dimensions in which the complexity of means-testing can vary, such as 
the individual or family unit used, or the way changes in circumstances are taken into 
account. This paper suggests that a sixth dimension of complexity is emerging (or re-
emerging), that of the degree of localisation of the means test. For the last forty years, 
while means tests may have been locally administered, they have generally used 
national rules. This is now changing. In the case study here, each of the more generous 
27 systems we have examined in detail for university bursaries or fee reductions from 
Autumn 2012 is different, and even the 25 universities relying mainly on the National 
Scholarship Programme vary significantly from one-another. In one sense this 
complexity is the aim of the current reforms – universities are intended to compete 
with one-another on the basis of price, and – especially given the uniformity of tuition 
fees – their support offers are now a central part of that competition. 
 
But many of the aspects of the systems which we have described have what are surely 
unintended consequences: 
 The systems on offer vary in many different ways, not just in their treatment of 
those with different levels of parental income, but also according to which year of 
study is involved, the mix of support between fee reductions and cash bursaries, 
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what kind of school an applicant went to, the kind of neighbourhood they live in, 
whether they were entitled to free school meals, and whether they put a university 
as their first choice. This makes comparison more complex than just looking at 
single prices. 
 Given the ‘cliff edges’ at particular income levels, precise levels of parental 
income – about which an applicant may only have very fuzzy knowledge – can 
make a difference worth thousands of pounds: Oxford may have a slightly better 
offer for some students with incomes up to £16,000 than Cambridge, but at 
£16,500, the Cambridge offer can be £4,000 more valuable, for instance. 
 For applicants to most universities outside the ‘Russell Group’, it is not clear at the 
time of application whether they would be one of those who would be offered one 
of the limited number of bursaries available. It is not clear when they will find this 
out – possibly at the time of receiving their A level results and any offers from the 
institutions they chose, or even later. This – together with the lack of detail from 
some universities about the criteria they will eventually apply – adds a substantial 
degree of uncertainty when applying and undermines the idea of students making a 
fully informed choice. 
 
Callender (2010, p.58) concluded from her survey of the system that emerged after 
2006 that, “Contrary to the government’s aspirations, a highly complex and confusing 
system of bursaries and scholarships has emerged with very different levels of 
support”, and the 2010 Browne report criticised it on that basis. Yet the survey 
reported here implies not just further complexity, but also much higher stakes as both 
fees and means-tested support have increased. 
 
At a deeper level, what we have ended up with is a combination of two different 
systems designed to get over the barriers to higher education entry and inequity in 
access that would exist in a pure market position: the general system of income-
contingent loan repayments based on a graduate’s later earnings, and what has 
become, given the level fees are rising to, an extensive system of means-tested support 
based on students’ parental income. The logic of the former is that what matters is 
someone’s lifetime position, but of the latter that choices are made on the basis of 
much shorter-term impressions. The combination can have some strange results: from 
the survey presented here, given that there is little variation in the fees being set, the 
treatment of students from low-income families at less prestigious universities will 
generally be much less favourable than that of low-income students at more 
prestigious ones, with the differences even greater than they were after 2006. 
 
All this suggests problems from the perspective of higher education finance. But it 
also suggests more general problems as means-tests are localised in other spheres. 
What may seem a reasonable response to fiscal constraints while trying to protect the 
poorest in one sphere may overlap chaotically with other attempts to do the same 
thing. Crucially, the problem is worse the greater the scale of the universal benefit that 
is being withdrawn. Means-tested support for students that tries to offset a large part 
of the cost of £9,000 fees for the lowest-income students, but is not given to higher 
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income ones, inevitably involves much higher effective marginal tax rates than when 
people were being protected against fees of £3,500. 
 
As we have seen, a typical scheme from one of the more prestigious universities 
involves total support of around £6,000 for students from families with incomes up to 
£25,000, withdrawn if family income is above £43,000. Just by itself this implies an 
average withdrawal rate of 33 per cent of additional income but, given the cliff edges 
involved in most of the schemes we have examined, there are income ranges where 
the marginal rates are far higher.  This is compounded by the way in which it interacts 
with other parts of the tax and benefit system. The university system is mainly based 
on parental gross income from two years before, but income tax, national insurance 
contributions and tax credit withdrawal will also have affected the net income the 
family received at the time. In combination, looked at retrospectively, many families 
(taken as a unit) would find that they were little or no better-off – or even worse off – 
than they would have been if they had started with a lower income. As we have 
argued, it is not necessarily incentive problems that are the issue here, as few will 
have the information to calculate their position in advance. But if people above key 
income thresholds understand that they have effectively faced marginal tax rates of 
considerably more than 100 per cent, they may feel aggrieved. 
 
When the Public Accounts Committee (2011) questioned officials from the Treasury 
and Department for Work and Pensions about the interactions between different kinds 
of means-testing, it became clear that there was no part of government actively taking 
an overview of them, and understanding what they add up to, or for promoting good 
design, such as the avoidance of cliff edges in tests for entitlement. As localisation is 
pushed further, and more and more agencies become responsible for designing their 
own systems, this gap will become more serious. What will also become clearer will 
be the limits to which previously universal services can be restricted to those with low 
incomes without extending and deepening overlapping ‘poverty traps’ well beyond the 
poor. 
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